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INSURANCE AS COMMERCE

IS THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE COMMERCE?
A RE-EXAMINATION IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN TIMES*
Nathan R. Berket

A

QUESTION of considerable import which has arisen time and
again in recent years, particularly since the enactment of the
various federal regulatory acts within the past decade, is whether the•
business of insurance is commerce. Although not a new question, and
by no means unanswered by the courts, it has been a subject of recent
reconsideration and in all probability will be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court.
On August 5, 1943, Judge E. Marvin Underwood of the United
States District Court of Georgia quashed an indictment in the case of
The United States of America v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association.1 The defendants, consisting of one hundred ninety-eight corporations and twenty-seven indiwduals, were charged with conspiring to
fix and maintain arbitrary and noncompetitive rates on fire insurance
sold by them in various southern states, in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. 2 They were further indicted on a charge of conspiring
to monopolize trade and commerce in fire insurance in those states in
violation of section 2 of the act. 3
The defendants demurred and challenged the sufficiency of the indictment upon the grounds that (a) it charged no offense against the
United States, (b) that the business of fire insurance is not commerce,
( c) that the interpretation of the act insisted upon by the government
would be a violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Amendments of the
Constitution, and ( d) that the court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The entire case turned, as the court put it, "upon the question as

*

The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and are not intended to
reflect the official attitude of the Office of the General Counsel of the Federal Security
Agency or of that Agency.
Field Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Security Agency;
LL.B., Detroit College of Law.-Ed.
1 ---F.Supp.---, 12 U.S.LawWeek, 2uo (1943).
2 15 U.S.C., l et. seq. (1940).
8 Id., § 2 reads: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished .••."
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to whether or not the business of insurance is interstate trade or commerce." 4
THE PROGENITOR CASE, PAUL v. VIRGINIA
In susta1ning the demurrer and holding that the bu$iness of insurance does not constitute commerce the court relied upon a series of
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The first of this group
was Paul v. Virginia decided seventy-five years ago in which Mr. Justice Field, writing the opinion, said:
". , . Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction in commerce. . . . Such contracts are not inter-state transactions, though
the parties be domiciled in differe:nt States." 5
•
Paul was appointed agent in Virginia for several insurance companies
incorporated in New York. He applied for a license to act as such
agent within Virginia. An act of that state required insurance companies
.not incorporated therein before carrying on any business within that
state to obtain a license for such purpose. As a prerequisite to obtaining
the license it was required to deposit with the state treasurer bonds of a
specified character varying in amount from $30,000 to $50,000, depending upon the amount of capital employed.0 Anot;her act prohibited,
under penalty,7 any person without a license to act as agent for any
foreign insurance company.
Paul offered to comply with· the provisions of the law save that
requiring the deposit of the bonds. Although a license was refused him,
he undertook to act for the companies and issued a policy to· a resident
of Virginia. He was indicted and convicted. The conviction was affirmed, by t}:ie :Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and a writ of error
was granted by the United States Supreme Court.
The second objection urged to the validity of the statute was based
upon the commerce clause. 8 Justice Field, after concluding that commerce may be carried on by corporations, said:
"There is, therefore, nothing in the fact that the insurance companies -of New York are corporations to impair the force of the
4 Also, of interest is the case of Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, (C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 175, in which the court giving some
ccnsideration to the question, stated the business of insurance was commerce. However,
the effect ·of the cou_rt's ruling thereon was minimized by its statement at p. 180 that
"the fact, if such it be, that insurance is not commerce" would not require it to reach
a differen_t result.
5 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 at 183 (1868).
6 Va. Acts, 18'66, ·c. 96, p. 206.
7 ld. c. 2, p. 32 at 48.
8 U. S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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argument of counsel. The defect of the argument lies in the
character of their business. Issuing a policy of insurance is not a
transaction of commerce. The policies are simple contracts of
indemnity against loss by fire, entered into between the corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by the latt~r. These
contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of
the word. They are not subjects of trade and barter offered in
the market as something having an existence and value independent of the parties to them. They are not commodities to be
shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and then put
up for sale. They are like other personal contracts between
parties which are completed by their signature and the transfer
of the consideration. Such contracts are not inter-state transactions,
though the parties may be domiciled in different States. The
policies do not take effect-are not executed contracts-until
delivered by the agent in Virginia. They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by the local law. They do not constitute
a part of the commerce between the States any more than a contract for the purchase and sale of goods in Virginia by a citizen
of New Yark whilst in Virginia would constitute a portion of such
commerce." 9
The foregoing pronouncement by the Court was urged by the
government's counsel in the South-Eastern Underwriters case, supra,
to be dictum.10 Judge Underwood brushed this contention ~ide,
stating:
"In all of the above cited cases, the ruling :was essential to the
case and the reasoning of the court showed most careful analysis
and full consideration of the questions now raised...." 11
A careful reading of the Paul decision impels agreement with the
Court that the ruling was not merely dicta. It does not appear that the
case could have been decided on the first issue alone which was whether
the statute was in conflict with~Article IV of the Constitution. 12 It was
urged that the statute discriminated between Virginia corporations and
corporations of other states. The Court found against this contention,
holding that corporations have no absolute right of recognition in other
states, but depend for such recognition and the enforcement of their
contracts upon the assent of such other states and that such assent inay
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 at 183 (1868).
Government brief, p. l 5.
11 - - - F . Supp. - - - a t - - - (1943).
12 U. S. Constitution, Art. 4, § 2: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
9

10
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be granted upon such terms and conditions as those states may think
proper to impose. This finding clearly could not determine the case
in the light of the defendant's objection to the validity of the statute
on the ground that it invaded the realm of interstate commerce which
was solely a matter under the supervision of Congress. If Paul's contention in this respect was upheld the statute would be invalid and his
conviction accordingly set aside. The issue, therefore, of whether insurance was interstate commerce was material to the determination of
the case. The Court's finding that the business of insurance was not
commerce, although a sweeping one and subject to considerable doubt
and criticism, has been rigidly adhered to by the Court in a number of
1
cases subsequently decided by it.
THE PROGENY OF PAUL

v.

VIRGINIA

In Hooper v. California,1-3 Hooper was convicted of violating a
section of the California Penal Code 14 in procuring insurance for a
re•sident of that state from an insurance co.mpany not incorporated
therein, without having filed the bond required by a sectio.µ of the
Political Code.15 The majority opinion,16 written by Mr. Justice White,
in answer to the claim that the contract being one for marine insurance
was a matter of interstate commerce and as such beyond the reach of
state authority, held:
'
" ... This proposition involves an erroneous conception of what
constitutes interstate commerce. That the business of insurance
does not generically appertain to such commerce has been settled
since the case of Paul v. Virginia, [supra.]
"Whilst it is true that in Paul v. Virginia, and in most of the
cases in which it has been followed,11 the particular contract under
155 U.S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207 (1895).
Cal. Penal Code,§ 439 (1887):
15 Cal. Political Code,§ 623, (1889) provided: "The Commissioner must require
every company, association, or individual, not incorporated under the laws of this Stat=,
and proposing to transact insurance business by agent or agents in this State, before commencing such business to file in his office a bond, to be signed by the person or firm,
officer or agent, as principal;with two sureties to be approved by the Commissioner, in
the penal sum of two thousand dollars for each insurance company, association, firm
or individual for whose account It is proposed to collect pr~miums of insurance in
this State.•••"
16 The minority opinion was predicated on an entirely different point.
17 The cases decided between Paul v. Virginia and Hooper v. California while
alluding to the Court's determination of the commerce question in the former did not
turn on that precise question.
13

14
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consideration was for insurance against fire, the principle upon
which these cases were decided involved the question of whether
a contract of insurance of any kind, constituted interstate commerce." 18
The Court in commenting upon the general rule that the right of a
foreign corporation to engage in business within a state other than that
of its creation depends solely upon the will of such other state and the
exceptions to this rule in so far as it relates to corporations which have
become an instrumentality of interstate commerce or their business
constitutes such commerce, stated:
" ... If the power to regulate interstate commerce applied to
all the incidents to which such commerce might give rise and to all
contracts which might be made in the course of its transaction, that
power would embrace the entire sphere of mercantile activity in
any way connected with trade between the States; and would
exclude state control over many contracts purely domestic in their
nature.
" ... The business of insurance is not commerce. The contract
of insurance is not an instrumentality of commerce. The making of
such a contract is a mere incident of commercial intercourse, and
in this respect there is no difference whatever between insurance
against fire and insurance against 'the perils of the sea.' " 19
This holding was again reiterated in the case of Liverpool and London
Life and Fire Insurance Company v. Oliver,2° in which a corporation
organized under the laws of the Kingdom of Great Britain and doing
business within the United States challenged the right of the State of
Massachusetts to collect a tax on premiums from business obtained by
the company in that state. This was the first case in which a company
was directly involved. The previous decisions concerned company
agents only.21
The next case in which the Court had occasion to maintain its
position, albeit dicta, was New York Life Insurance Company v.
Cravens. 22 Here again a company was involved.
Hooper v. State of California, I 55 U. S. 648 at 6 53, 15 S. Ct. 207 ( I 89 5).
Id. at 655.
20 10 Wall. (77 U.S.) 566 (1871).
21 It is interesting to note that even at that early date the Court commented upon
18
19

the fact that corporations in the form of banking companies, insurance companies, et
cetera, play an extensive part in the business of the nation. However, it apparently
refused to recede from its position taken in the Paul case.
22 178 U.S. 389, 20 S. Ct. 962 (1900).
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One of the more important cases on this question to come before
the Supreme Court was New York Life Insurance Company cv. Deer
Lodge County. It was there asserted that a tax levied by a Montana
county on certain assets of the compfny was "illegal, unlawful and
V(?id for that said defendant was without jurisdiction to levy or collect
said tax, and the levy and collection thereof was and is a burden upon
interstate commerce contrary to section 8, Article I of the Constitution
of the United States." 23 Counsel for the company, which included the
illustrious Dean Pound of Harvard Law School, in an endeavor to
swing the Court away from-the Paul case, argued that since all decisions
pertaining to the company's business were rendered in New York, the
authority of its Montana representative was strictly limited and that
applications for insurance were received solely for the purpose of
transmission to the home office and the use of the United States mails
was essential to practically every step in the transaction of its business.
The majority opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice McKenna, adverting to the earlier 24 decisions on the point, stated:

"If we consider these _cases numerically, the deliberation of
their reasoning, and the time they cover, they constitute a formidable body of authority and strongly invoke the sanction of the rule
of stare decisis. This we especially emphasize, for all of the cases
concerned, as the case at bar does, the validity of state legislation,
and under varying circumstances the same principle was applied
in all of them. For over forty-five years they have been the legal
justification for such legislation. To reverse the cases, therefore,
would require us to promulgate _a new rule of. constitutional inhibition upon the States and which would compel a change of
their policy and a readjustment of their laws. Such result necessarily urges agaipst a change of decision." 25
231 U.S. 4-95 at 499, 34 S. Ct. 167 (1913).
The dissenters were Mr. Justice Hughes, who had a few years before been counsel to the Armstrong Committee investigating insurance company, practices in New York,
and Mr. Justice Van Devanter.
25 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495 at 502, 34 S. Ct.
167 (1913). Cf. Black & White Taxi'cab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& '.fransfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 48 S. Ct. 404 (1928), in which Mr. Justice Holmes
writing the dissent concurred in by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone, referring to Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (41 U. S.) 1 (1842), said:
"If I am right the fallacy has resulted in an unconditional assumption of powers
by the Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion
should make us hesitate to correct."
Compare, also, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304, U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817. (1938),
23

24
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The majority were of the opinion that the rationale of Paul 'V.
Virginia was exhaustive of the general principle and that "it would
rack ingenuity to attempt to vary its expression or more aptly illustrate
it." The volume of business and the geographical extent thereof did
not appear to impress Justice McKenna and those of his colleagues who
joined with him for: "Nor does the character of the contracts change
by their numbers or ~he residence of the parties."
Neither did the company's argument that the use of the mails in
connection with its busin~s constituted a "current of commerce among
the states" move the Court to alter its established view. In answer to
this the Court said:
"· .. This use of the mails is necessary, it may be, to the centralization of the control and supervision of the details of the business; it is not essential to its character." 26
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Bothwell 'V. Buckbee, Mears Co.,21 held a
contract of insurance made by a foreign corporation with a citizen of
Minnesota was not interstate commerce. The Court, in that case, did
not go as far as it did in the Paul and Hooper cases and hold that the
business of insurance was not commerce at all.28
In a comparatively recent case, Western Li'Ve Stock 'V. Bureau of
Re'Venue, Mr. Justice Stone, citing the Paul, Hooper, and Deer Lodge
County cases, supra, stated:
·
"That the mere formation of a contract between persons in different states is not within the protection of the commerce clause,
at least in the absence of Congressional action, unless the performance is within its protection, is a proposition no longer open
to question." 29
WHAT IS COMMERCE?

In order to determine whether or not the business of insurance is
commerce it is necessary to ascertain just what commerce is as defined
by the Supreme Court.
which overruled Swift v. Tyson, supra, which had been hallowed by almost a century
of existence.
26 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U. S. 495 at 509, 34 S.
Ct. 167 (1913).
21 275 U.S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 124 (1927).
28 On this point, id. at p. 216, the Court said: "A contract of insurance, although
made with a corporation having its office in a State other than that in which the insured
resides and in which the interest insured is located, is not interstate commerce."
29 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 at 253, 58 S. Ct. 546

(1938).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 42

The first attempt by the Supreme Court to define the term "commerce" was made in Gibbons 'V. 0 gden, in which the Constitution's
most distinguished interpreter, Chief Justice Marshall, said:
" ... Commerce undoµbtedly is traffic, but it is something
more; it is intercourse. It q.escribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches ....
"· .. It has, we believe, been universally admitted that these
words ( of the commerce clause) comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations." 30
This broad and general interpretation has permitted the courts to
expand the concept of commerce to include many things which were
unknown to and not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution.
By-passing many of the intervening years in which the Supreme
Court had occasion from time to time to refer to Chief Justice Marshall's definition and to expand thereon, we arrive at the important
case of Pensacola Telegraph Co. 'V. Western Union Telegraph Co.,81
in which the Court, seemingly in an effort to demonstrate that it was
keeping abreast of the times and the advance of civilization with its
attendant developments, inventions, and complications arising out of
an expanding economy and a growing country, said:
"The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or the postal system known or in use when
the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress
of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of
time and circumstances. They extend from the horse with its rider
to the stage-coach, from the sailing-vessel to the steamboat, from
the coach and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad
to the telegraph, as these new agencies are successively brought into use to meet the demands of increasing population and wealth."
In ]f!ternational Texabook Co. 'V. Pigg,81a the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, sued on a contract providing for installment payments for a course of instruction by correspondence in commercial
law. The contract was entered into in Kansas with a citizen of that
state through a solicitor of plaintiff. The solicitor not only solicited
students to take the various correspondence courses offered by plaintiff
but also collected the installment payments. He maintained an office
so Gibbons v. Ogden, 8 Wheat. (22 U. _S.) 1 at 188, 192 (1824).
96 U. 8. I at 9 (1877).
sla 217 U.S. 91, 30 S. Ct. 481 (1910).
81
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in Kansas at his own expense. The company had no office of its own
in that state. He would remit the collections to the company by mail
and it would send its course of instruction to the enrollee through the
mail.
Here was a case which involved a private contract of a local nature,
yet the Court found that the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce. In holding that a Kansas statute which required foreign corporations to perform certain conditions precedent to doing business
within that state directly burdened the interstate business of plaintiff,
Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for the majority, said:
"It is true that the business in which the International Textbook
Company is engaged is of a somewhat exceptional character, but,
in our judgment, it was, in its essential characteristics, commerce
among the states within the meaning of the Constitution of the
United States. It involved, as already suggested, regular and,
practically, continuous intercourse between the Textbook Company, located in Pennsylvania, and its scholars and agents in
Kansas and other States. That intercourse was conducted by·means
of correspondence through the mails with such agents and
scholars . . . this mode-looking at the contracts between the
Textbook Company and its scholars-involved the transportation
from the State where the school is located to the State in which
the scholar resides, of books, apparatus and papers, useful or
necessary in the particular course of study the scholar is pursuing. . . . Intercourse of that kind, between parties in different
States-particularly when it is in execution of a valid contract
between them-is as much intercourse, in the constitutional sense,
as intercourse by means of the telegraph-'a new species of
commerce'. . . ." 82
··
One would rightfully assume on the basis of the sweeping language
in the foregoing opinion that the Court was drawing away from its views
in the Paul case and was ready, when confronted with the issue, to
recognize the business of insurance as commerce.33 However, the Court,
32 The International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 at 106, 30 S. Ct.
481 (1910).
83 It is well known that insurance agents forward applications for policies to the
company's home office by mail and that the policies are mailed by the company to its
agents or direct to the applicants. Thereafter there is correspondence between the
company and the insured with respect to premium notices, loans, proofs of loss, proofs
of death, reports of the company's financial condition, etc. This intercourse would
seem to grow out of and in execution of the contract between the insurer and the
insured.
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when put to the test, found itself ineluctably bound to its views in the
Paul case,3 and reiterated what it there said in the Deer Lodge
County 85 and Bothwell cases,36 previously discussed herein. Both of
these cases were before the Court after it had decided the International
Textbook and Pensacola Telegraph cases.
In the Deer Lodge County case counsel for the insurance company
directed the Court's attention to its decision i11 the International Textbook case. The Court, however, sought to distinguish its holding in
the latter Ol]. the ground that there the transaction involved transportation of property and not "mere personal contracts" such as insurance
which is not commerce "at all." The answer to such a tenuous distinction is found in the. facts in the International Textbook case. The
transaction involved therein, a contract for a course of study in commercial law, reqµired nothing more in the way of transportation of
property than is involved in a transaction whereby a policy of insurance
is purchased at an agreed price (premium) from ,a company located
in another state. The purchase of a policy also involves the transportation of property over state lines-the mailing of the policy and future
correspondence relating to the policy which is the contract between the
parties. To place the distinction upon the basis which the Court did is
to overlook the development aµd growth of the modern insurance
corporation, its part and force in the nation's economic life and to
cloister oneself against realities.
,
In a case involving the Fair Labor Standards Act, 37 Kirschbaum
Co. v. Walling, it was held that employees of a building owner who
did the work of maintaining and operating the building in which the
tenants were principally engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce were engaged in an "occupation necessary to the production" 38 of goods in interstate commerce. The rationale of the court
was that without light, heat and power the tenants could not engage
in the production of goods for interstate commerce. Of course it could
be said, as did the Court, that since the act included persons engaged
"in any process or occupation necessary to the production" and because
the persons engaged in maintaining a building were engaged in a
process or occupation necessary to enable the actual producers to pro,l

a,i 8 Wall. (75, U.S.) 168 (1868).
231 U.S. 495, 34 S. Ct. 167 (1913).
86 275 U.S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 124 (1927).
87 29 U.S. C., § 201· et seq. (1940).
38 Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316.U. S. 517 at 524, 62 S. Ct. III6 (1942).
85
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duce the goods to be used for interstate commerce, such persons were
within the ambit of the act. It is to be noted that such reasoning was
applied in a situation where the persons employed for such purposes
were the employees not of the producers of the goods but of the
owner of the building in which the producers rented space.
The validity of the Court's rationale and conclusion has been questioned.89 In fact, these maintenance and service employees were engaged in keeping the building habitable and were performing certain
services which are essential in order for a landlord to acquire and
retain tenants. Such maintenance and services while beneficial to the
tenants would appear to be merely incidental to their use of the space
occupied by them. However, what is important, in connection with
the consideration of the subject of this paper, is the fact that the
opinion revealed the Court's broad thinking on the subject of interstate
commerce and its willingness to expand ,the commerce concept to take
in activities of a local nature which indirectly and remotely contribute
to making it possible to carry on an activity interstate in character.
Further evidence of such willingness on the part of the Court is
found in the case of Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture v. Filburn. 40
In that case a small wheat grower who grew wheat for consumption
on his own farm was held liable to the marketing penalty under the ,
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.41 The Cour.t, Mr. Justice Jackson
speaking, held that a local activity, though not regarded as commerce,
"may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective
of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.' " 42
In a very recent case, National Labor Relations Board v. J. L.
Hudson Co., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the question
of whether the National Labor Relations Act 48 was applicable to a
retail department store located in Detroit, Michigan.
It was established that in 1942 the store purchased merchandise
of the cost of $43,864,289 and that over eighty percent thereof was
shipped to it from outside the state. A comparatively insignificant
89 Lichtenstein, "C~mmerce-Power to Regulate Sale and Production of Goods,"
CHI-KENT L. REV. 103 (1942).
40 317 u. s. III, 63 s. Ct. 82 (1942).
41 7 U. S. C., Supp. I, § 1340 (1940).
42 Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III at 125, (3 S. Ct.
82 (1942). Italics supplied.
48 29 U. S. C., § 151 et seq. (1940).

21

420
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amount, $300,000 in value, was shipped to it from foreign countries.
Only one and six-tenths percent of its total sales were sold and shipped
to customers outside the state. In shipping such out of state sales, the
'Store used the parcel post, the railway express, trains and interstate
truck lines. One-sixth of its advertising costs through the various
media was expended for circulation in states other than Michigan.
Upon tµe basis of .-.these facts, the court found that the activities of
the store although "intrastate in character when considered separately,"
were "so dosely and substantially related to interstate commerce that
their control is essenfial or appropriate for the protection of interstate
commerce from burden or obstruction. . . ." 44
Reasoning by analogy, it would seem that the same conclusion may
be reached with respect to the insurance company which maintains
offices in various states, employs the postal services, the railroad, and
advertises through the media of nati01ial radio hookups, newspapers,
magazines and pamphlets and whose vast premium and investment
income is received from persons and property located in other states
many of which are far removed from its home office. An even stronger
case, as will presently be seen, can be made for the position that such
an insurance company is engaged in and 1ts activities affect interstate
commerce.
·Thus it would appear that the Supreme Court has discarded the
restrictive criteria of "transportation of property',' and "direct" effect
upon interstate commerce. for the' purpose of determining whether an
activity was in or affected interstate commerce. The modern concept
is that if an activity, although local in character, exerts a substantial
economic effect upon interstate commerce, irrespective of whether such
effect is direct or indirect~ it is subject to federal regulatory action. 45
THE ADMINISTRATIVE

'?iiIEWPOINT

The National Labor Relations Board in The Matter of John
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company and American Federation
of Industrial and Ordinary Insurance Agents Union No. 2I57r, etc.
and in The Matter of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company
44 National Labor Relations Board v. J. L. Hudson Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 135
F. (2d) 380 at 382.
45 Upon this Mr. Justice Jackson in ·Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. II I at 123,
63 S. Ct. 82 (1942), said: "Th~ Court's recognition of the relevance of the economic
effects in the application of the Commerce Clause . . . has made the mechanical application of legal formulas no longer feasible;"
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and Industrial Insurance Agents' Union Local No. 84, etc.46 adopted a
realistic attitude by taking cognizance of the fact that insurance was a
business of considerable magnitude and a force majeure in the economic
sphere. The Federation of Insurance Agents filed a petition in which
it was alleged that a question affecting commerce had arisen concerning
the representation of employees in the East St. Louis, Illinois, district
office of the company, a Massachusetts organization. In the case
second-named, supra, a petition was filed by the Industrial Insurance
Agents' Union Local of the United Office and Professional Workers of
America conc~rning representation of employees in the Hoboken, New
Jersey, district office of the company.
The National Labor Relations Board on the issue of "commerce"
found:
" ... that the questions concerning representation which have
arisen, occurring in connection with the operations of the company ... have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade,
traffic, commerce, and transportation among the several States,
and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce." 47
Because the board's findings of facts point up the ramifications
of the insurance business, its interrelationship with other businesses
which fall within the ken of commerce, and the effect it has on our
economic life, a recital of some of the findings would be beneficial
and of interest in connection with the consideration of the problem
herein discussed.
It was found that on December 31, 1937, the company had more
than eight million policies in force with a total face amount of over
four billion dollars and that its policyholders, who resided in all the
states of the United States and in foreign countries, numbered approximately five million, six hundred thousand. From 1929 to 1938, the
dividends paid amounted to over fifteen million dollars per year. The
company's assets, derived from premium payments and earnings on its
investments, were invested in a large number and variety of securities.
Each policyholder was the owner of a proportionate share of those
assets and through its investment program the company afforded each
policyholder a diversity of investments not usually available to individual investors through direct purchase of securities. It also was
46

47

26 N.L.R.B. 1024, cases Nos. R-1747 and R-1748 (August 23, 1940).
Id., case No. R-17 48 at 103 I.
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found that on December 31, 1938, the company's assets totaled $924,000,000 and that most of its cash was on deposit in commercial banks
throughout the country. From 1934 to 1938, the company annually
had available for investment over $136,000,000.
The diversity of its investments and the extent of its interests in
other businesses w~re established by the fact that in 1938 it invested
more than $18,000,000 in public utility bonds, more than $14,000,000
in bonds purchased from companies engag!!d in the business 'of financing
automobile sales on a nation-wide basis and large manufacturing and
packing corporations, its investment in real estate mortgages was over
$163,000,000 and of this amount over $9,000,000 was invested in
such property as 'hotels, general stores, office buildings, department
stores, auto sales show rooms, storage garages, warehouse buildings
and auto service stations. 48
The board after finding the foregoing facts said:
"The nature and extent of the facilities which insurance companies afford to the commercial life of the nation are so well known
as to require neither proof nor discussion. Insurance companies generally, and_the Company in particular, as stated by it in its Agent's
Manual, perform a 'disti~guished public service ... through wide
distribution of funds under a program of diversified investment.'
The amount of money annually invested by insurance companies
in commercial enterprises of almost every description is huge; that
its withdrawal from the money market would seriously impair that
free flow of capital and credit which is essential to the commercial
life of the United States is beyond question.
"The prominent place of the Company in the insurance business in the United States is clear from the foregoing. So also is it
clear that the Company, by its loans totalling hundreds of millions
of dollars to industry and railroads, to power companies, telephone
companies, and other public utilities, to companies engaged in
large scale financing of automobile sales, and to other commercial
enterprises, makes a contribution to the nation's commercial and
industrial life and transportation systems which, if disturbed,
would p~ralyze much of tp,e nation's commercial life." 49
~

48 The board also found the company had fifty-one general agents in thirty-one
states and the Territory of Hawaii; 369 district offices in thirty-four states, the District
of Columbia and the Territory of Hawaii; that it employed sixty-eight agents and four
correspondents in the various states to manage its real estate interests; that it had fortyeight loall: companies in twenty-three states and the District of Columbia through whom
its _mortgage investments are made.
49 26 N.L.R.B. 1024, case No. 1748 at p. 1029 (1940). According to the
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The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has
said that the activities of most employees of insurance companies are
so closely interwoven with activities in interstate commerce, including
the constant use of the mails and other instrumentalities of commerce,
as to be a part of such commerce.50
CONCLUSION

It thus appears very clearly that there is nothing sacrosanct about
insurance or the contract of insurance and that it is a pure commercial
enterprise and transaction which is a potent force in the everyday
business world. That insurance companies control tremendous pools
of capital and that the handling of these reservoirs of wealth has a
considerable impact upon the capital and securities markets and correspondingly reacts upon the national economy cannot be gainsaid.
When the Paul case was decided the business was "to a great
extent local; that is, conducted through the domestic contracts by stock
companies. The great and commanding organizations of the present
day had hardly begun the amazing developments which have made
them the greatest associations of administrative trusts of the business
world." 51 Modern insurance is essentially in character national and
international.
INSURANCE ALMANAC for 1943, at the close of 1942, the aggregate amount of insurance in force of 209 life companies was $128,833, 795, 649 and the combined dividends paid to policy-holders in the year was $436,678,255.
TIME MAGAZINE, 77 (Oct. 4, 1943) reports that United States life insurance
companies have $36,000,000,000 in assets, the world's second greatest pool of private
capital and in the first eight months of 1943 they wrote $5,531,393,000 worth of new
business. That 67,000,000 United States citizens own policies worth an approximate
total of $133,000,000,000. If the figures of the various fire, casualty and marine
companies were added, the total sum of insurance in force and the assets controlled
directly or indirectly by the companies would be even more staggering.
50 U. S. Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour Div., 1st Annual Rep., p. 19 (1939);
2 C.C.H. Labor Law Service, § 23,560.084. Observe that reference is made to the
use of the mails. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 34
S. Ct. 167 (1913), it was urged, without avail, that the use of the mails was essential
to practically every step in the transaction of the company's business.
51 Argument of the company's counsel in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178
U.S. 389, 20 S. Ct. 962 (1900), quoted from New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge
County, 231 U. S. 495 at 507, 34 S. Ct. 167 (1913). Interestingly enough, in
all of the cases from Paul v. Virginia to New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge
County, the companies and their agents were urging that the business of insurance was
commerce. In 1892 a bill (H.B. 9629) which had been drafted at the direction of
the President of the Union Central Life Insurance Company was introduced in Congress to provide for federal supervision but failed to become law. Again in 1897 a
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This expansion has brought about a situation in which the home
office is locateq. in a state in one part of the continent while the insurance
is in force and the risk insured is located in a state in another part of
the continent.52 Surely, this is an affirmative phase of interstate commerce.
similar bill was introduced in the United States Senate which also failed of passage.
Contrast the present attitude of insurance companies toward federal supervision. See
"Effects of Federal Supervision," CASUALTY lNSUROR, 3 (Aug. 1943); "Federal Supervision of Insurance," MANAGEMENT REv. 352 (Sept. 1943); "More Legislation by
Fiat," NAT. UNDERWRITER, life ins. ed., (Sept. IO, 1943); EASTERN UNDERWRITER,
Part 2, pp. 1, 18, 20, 22 (Oct. 1, 1943); EASTERN UNDERWRITER, pp. 1, 3, 30 (Oct.
8, 1943).
52 ln many instances the home offices are located in foreign lands. Numerous
British, Canadian and Japanese companies do and have done business in the United
States, e.g. Liverpool, London and Globe Insurance Company, North British and Mercantile Insurance Company, Great-West Life of Canada, Sun Life Assurance Company
of Canada, and the Tokio Fire and Marine Insurance Company. For a complete list
of such foreign companies see the INSURANCE ALMANAC (1942). Th'.e Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, one of the largest life insurance companies in the world,
recently announced ,that its investment in United States Government Bonds alone
totaled $137,636,161. See EASTERN UNDERWRITER, p. 2-3, col. 2 (Oct. 8, 1943).

